Easter

It's Easter.

Our calendar is looking weirdly empty for the next five days, and Mulan and Miya are looking forward to relaxing with almost nothing planned.

For lunch today they're having Chinese time; they're out with Mama and friends having a restaurant meal.

Meanwhile, over the past few days I've been enjoying contemplating the meaning of Easter as originally intended in the Gospels of the Bible.

This video is part one of a multipart mini-series by James Tabor.  It's decently detailed, with each 20-50min video covering one day in the story of Jesus' final week.  Highly recommended for those interested in the texts themselves.

But here's my practical takeaway message from the first couple of days:

Those who know me know that I'm an ethical vegetarian.  Animals have the capacity to suffer -- they feel pain and have their own interests.  We shouldn't unnecessarily cause them pain and suffering.  We (mostly) don't need to eat them.

I'm delighted that Jesus in the Gospels was strongly and forcefully trying to put a stop to the unnecessary torture and slaughter of millions of animals.  On day two, when Jesus disrupts the temple, he quotes the Hebrew Bible as scriptural authority to stop the killing of the animals.

I really hope that more Christians would follow Jesus on this one.

Book review: Kathleen Stock

Several weeks ago I mentioned (here and here) that I'd been inspired to read Kathleen Stock's 2021 book Material Girls: Why Reality Matters for Feminism.

I finished it on Monday 4th.  (Unfortunately I also had to return it to the library that day, so I'm writing this from memory.  Hope I get it right, but happy to be corrected on anything.)

This is a book on sex and gender.  As best I can see, Stock is strongly in favour of reducing the social stigma associated with sex/gender nonconformity.  In this respect she is both a member and ally of the rainbow community, fighting against those who think that heterosexuality is the only correct option for everyone.

Nonetheless, her opinions about trans people have resulted in a lot of hatred against her from the trans community.  This book is her response.

Whatever the case about what Stock's critics claim, as best I can see she has a "you do you" approach, that consenting adults should be free to choose for themselves and/or express for themselves their sex/gender orientation, presentation and identity, whatever it is.  That is, consenting adults should be free to be romantically/sexually attracted to whoever they like (or not at all), and have relationships as they like.  They should be free to present themselves as they like, following whatever sex/gender norms/roles they like (or not at all).  And they should be free to identify as any sex/gender they like (or not at all).  That people do all of this is just people expressing themselves, and it's simply variation within human populations.  Society, and the law, should fully support this right, and work to reduce any impediments or stigmas.  (Though Stock does have opinions about gender identity theory, and how it is used in law; more below.)

In the book she takes this mostly as a given, and doesn't argue for it.  She wants to deal with other stuff to do with sex and gender.

I completely agree with this, and I would treat this as a freedom issue.  People should be free to choose for themselves what they do, as long as it doesn't harm others.  (So, consent and maturity are important.)  As I see it, those who deny this need to show why something else is more important than people's freedom.  As yet I haven't seen it (eg unnatural, distasteful, or against religious authority are all bad reasons).

In the book the stuff that Stock wants to deal with includes language, theories, laws, and rights to certain public resources/spaces.

Stock questions certain terms and ideas that some people use as useful and accurate descriptions of the way things are.  (Importantly, in this respect she doesn't question people's rights to do/be, but she sometimes questions the accuracy with respect to how they describe and explain their doing and being.)

And she points out that with respect to some public resources/spaces there is conflict as to who has the right to use them (women's rights versus trans rights).  This conflict means that not everyone can have their own way, and Stock has opinions (with reasons) why society, and the law, should go one way rather than another.

Thirdly, she also raises the question of whether children/minors should medically transition, as there are issues of properly informed consent, medical risks, and changeable/temporary self-opinions.

Importantly, Stock wants to separate out the rights to freedom, etc, as above, which she supports, versus the rights to certain specific public funding, public spaces access, labeling, and participations, which she treats case by case and doesn't always support.  Stock sees herself as aiming for a reasoned, nuanced view, between the extremes of opinion.  She labels this as non-binary, in the sense of rejecting the argumentative binary of us-vs-them.

She emphasises that questioning or restricting the latter is not transphobic, as is claimed by some of her critics.  I agree with her.

Nonetheless, I do think Stock's tone of voice in the book is not always neutral sounding.  Ideally a writer should try to present all views, including those they disagree with, in the strongest possible way.  Stock's tone made me feel a little uneasy that she hadn't done this with her interlocutors.  While I have a decent background in philosophy, this is a topic I haven't studied in much depth, so I'm still a little unclear about the specific theoretical and argumentative terrain.  I came away from the book feeling that I couldn't entirely trust Stock's explanations and interpretations of issues, while occasionally not being sure precisely where the problems were.  If we want to understand the issues I don't think we should use this book as a single-source textbook.  It needs to be used with guidance from other sources.

Sex:

The first language point that Stock deals with is sex -- the biological category, not the act.  Stock sees sex as binary (male or female) and not a spectrum.  She also thinks that it cannot literally be changed.  For her, this is simply accepting the facts of reality.  But let's build up a bit first.

As Forrest Valkai says, reality is what reality is.  Every model, every theory, every bit of language we have is wrong, in the sense that it doesn't map perfectly onto reality.  But that doesn't mean that they are all worthless -- just that some are more useful in some contexts.  Whenever we use language, and whenever we theorise, we draw imperfect boxes around reality to distinguish some parts from others, for some particular use.

In this sense, our language and theories are always subjective and social, choosing to pick out and distinguish one contrast rather than another.  We subjectively choose to draw a box around objective reality here rather than there.  And sometimes it's useful to ask why our boxes are in the places that they are.  Why is this distinction important rather than that?

An example: The other day I needed to show my birth certificate for identification verification.  Back in 1975 it was seen as important to include my dad's occupation on my birth certificate.  It was an objective fact of reality that at the time he was a "Television Salesman".  But it was also a subjective/social decision to include this objective fact on my birth certificate.  Why was this objective fact seen as important?  My dad was a TV salesperson for just a short time in his life, and went on to do many other things.  But forever my birth record is going to include what my dad happened to be doing to earn money at the time of my birth.  Interestingly though, my birth certificate does not include my mum's occupation.  In 1975 this was not an objective fact of reality that was subjectively worth drawing a box around.  (My children's birth certificates don't include anyone's occupation.)

My birth certificate also includes my sex; it has me as "M".  For various reasons our society has subjectively decided that this piece of objective reality is worth drawing a box around.  My children's birth certificates also have their sex listed.

But what do we mean by this?  And how was it determined?

As Stock points out, we mostly learn language as children through adults pointing out exemplars to us.  We learn about men and women, males and females, through seeing enough examples to get the general idea.  It mostly works well enough in most situations.

At my birth doctors ticked the "M" box for me after a visual inspection of my genitals.  And after I got clothes, people mostly thought of me as "M" based not on my genitals but on my clothes, my name, my hair length, my body shape, etc, etc.  They'd seen enough examples to categorise me in that way without the doctor's tick.

Again, this mostly works well enough in most situations.  (Although when pre-pubescent me had longer hair some people thought I was a girl.)

But this is a rather fuzzy-edged box that we as a society have drawn around reality.  And it's sometimes useful to draw it more finely.  Stock describes three different definitional ways in which people like to draw the sex boxes, making it clear that she thinks that each are equally good in their own way, for their own purposes, and that she doesn't choose one over the others.  As I say, she thinks that all three definitions entail that sex is binary and cannot be changed.  I agree with her about the first two, but am unsure about the third.

Gametes: Here, males are defined as the types of organisms that have the biological equipment to produce smaller faster gametes (ie, sperm).  And females are defined as the types of organisms that have the biological equipment to produce larger slower gametes (ie, eggs).

Almost always, people fall into one or other camp (it's essentially binary), and almost always this maps people's visual ideas of male and female.  Biologist Jerry Coyne points out that on this definition intersex happens about once every 5500 times (about as often as a coin toss would land on its side, which we usually call binary).

Nonetheless, due to the quirks of complicated reality, some people's gametes don't match their outward visual.  This happens in various ways, but one example is that some people are born with (internal) testes but otherwise grow up looking exactly like women, with vaginas, etc.  Unless they were specifically tested they could live their entire lives assuming they were merely infertile females.  Under this definition occasionally we may think that someone is one sex but they really are the other sex.

Coyne strongly prefers this definition.  His reasoning is that sex has to do with reproduction, and this particular definition clearly distinguishes the two types of organism that differ with respect to their reproductive equipment.  Drawing this particular box around reality is useful when considering reproduction (but not necessarily when considering other things, including sex determination and development, as well as human social interactions).  It is not saying that this is all that people, or human development, are, but it is saying that this is the relevant difference with respect to reproduction.  For Coyne, gametes define, chromosomes (discussed below) largely (but not completely) determine (also discussed below), and other sex characteristics (discussed below) typically detect.

Chromosomes: Here, human males are defined as the types of organisms that have XY chromosomes, and human females are defined as the types of organisms that have XX chromosomes.  (This doesn't always work for other species, as there are other ways than XX/XY to produce males and females.)

Nonetheless, again, similar to the gametes definition, this definition works almost always to match our visual, and is essentially binary, but reality is complicated and there are exceptions.  Since reality is complicated, the fact that there are exceptions doesn't necessarily invalidate the definition, but it should make us more aware that definitions can lead us wrongly into too rigid thinking.  We shouldn't let our definitions lead our understanding of reality.

Cluster concept: A third approach to defining human sex involves recognising that there are lots of sex characteristics, and we could draw up a long list of these.  A cluster approach recognises that while all of these characteristics are part of the picture, none of them is essential.  What is important is that enough of them are present to count.  How long is the list, and how many are needed?  That's the fuzzy bit.

However, I didn't find Stock especially clear on this.  Maybe I missed something, but my impression was that Stock handwaved the definition to get to an answer that suited her -- that we set up a cluster concept that would make sex binary and unchangeable.  I also wasn't sure I followed her reasoning where she rejected the possibility of medical treatment as a way of changing these characteristics to change one's sex.

Another biologist, P Z Myers, prefers this cluster approach definition of sex over the other two.  He thinks that all of these characteristics are aspects of sex, and leaving them out is too reductionist.  The part of reality that Myers is drawing a box around when defining sex is the wider context of determination and development, and not merely reproduction (Myers is a developmental biologist, so this is a relevant definition for his field of studies).  Consequently he sees sex as bimodal rather than binary.  But contrary to Stock, Myers seems open to the possibility of medical treatment changing enough sex characteristics to literally change one's sex.

Here is Myers responding to Richard Dawkins (who defends the gametes definition of sex).

And responding to a question about Coyne's position:

Judge for yourself, but I think Myers mistakenly thinks that Dawkins/Coyne's position requires one to reduce people to gametes.  I think a fairer understanding is that they are simply narrowing the discussion, and hence the definition.  That is, I think Myers strawpersons Dawkins/Coyne.

But I think Myers makes an important point that we should not use definitions of sex alone to decide on social issues such as sports participation, changing rooms, prisons, etc, etc (discussed below).  Gamete size may often correlate, but is not itself the reason why we might want to separate groups of people or not.

Here, Myers gives a lecture on sex determination (as far as I can see, I think it's possible to recognise that sex determination is complicated and variable, while holding the gamete definition of sex):

So, overall, Stock's position is that whatever plausible definition of sex we use (whichever way we choose to draw the box around reality), sex is binary and unchangeable.  And if we are to use language properly we should recognise this aspect of reality, and not say that there are many sexes or that trans people really change sex when they transition.

This is one of the ways that Stock gets on the wrong side of the trans community, when insisting that trans people don't really change their sex.

I think for some definitions of sex this is true, but I'd like to see a bit more clarity of discussion between Stock and Myers.  If Myers' preferred definition of sex is coherent, used and useful, then Stock hasn't shown that sex must be binary and unchangeable (just that on some definitions it is).

In what follows for the rest of this piece, I'll assume that sex is either binary or bimodal, and in this context I will occasionally refer to people who are male-looking, etc, while acknowledging that to some extent that is an imprecise language shortcut.

Gender:

The second language point Stock deals with is gender. And pinning down what we might mean by this is even more difficult.

It is often said that while the words "male" and "female" refer to sex, the words "man" and "woman" refer to gender.  But what do we mean when we talk about men and women, and how is this different from males and females?  Again, there are several definitions -- several different ways we may choose to draw boxes around aspects of reality -- and each may be useful in different ways.  So, an important question is why we might choose one way rather than another.

One important and legitimate use of the words "man" and "woman" is to distinguish mature humans from immature humans.  It is important to know and talk about when children become mature enough to reach adulthood, taking on adult responsibilities and having adult rights.  So, man is contrasted with boy, and woman is contrasted with girl.  With this useful and important way of drawing boxes around reality, men are adult human males and women are adult human females.  Stock calls this the traditional view.

To jump ahead of myself a bit, Stock thinks that this is the best definition of the words "man" and "woman", and she thinks this is the way that we English-speakers should use the words.  In this respect her approach to the word "gender" is different from her approach to the word "sex", where she didn't commit to any particular definition.  So, the logical reasoning is going to be different.

A large part of her book is spent discussing other definitions of "man" and "woman" -- other ways of understanding gender -- and then critiquing them to show how they all fail.  Her basic approach is to either show that (a) on logical inspection the proposed definition is incoherent, or (b) while coherent, the words depart too much from our usual/traditional understanding of "man" and "woman", and so these different definitions (different ways of drawing boxes around reality) should have their own (new) terminologies and not usurp the already existing language.

So, for Stock, using this definition means that consequently (a) gender is binary and (b) people cannot change their gender (since Stock has argued that sex is binary and people cannot change their sex).  For Stock, this means that trans people do not really change their gender (or sex) when they transition.  And man and woman are the only genders (no third genders for Stock).

Again, we should emphasise that Stock thinks it's perfectly okay to be trans and it's perfectly okay to transition, if one wants to do so.  You do you.  She is not questioning the existence of trans people.  And she is not questioning their right to be equal members of society.  Similarly, she thinks that it's perfectly okay to be sex/gender nonconforming, if one feels that way.

But she thinks that we should be accurate with our language (reality matters) and not claim that a trans person really, literally, changed sex or gender.  She thinks we should have another word for it (another word to refer to the box we draw around the part of reality that includes transition).  For Stock, saying "trans woman" is not in the same category as saying "Asian woman".  (A few years ago Mulan danced in a ballet show based on Alice in Wonderland, where she was the Mock Turtle.  At the time we discussed whether she was a real turtle or not.)

So, this is another of the ways that Stock often gets on the wrong side of the rainbow community.  Many trans people want to say that they have genuinely changed gender (or possibly sex).  And many gender/sex nonconforming people want to say that they are genuinely outside the man/woman binary.

To explain this feeling of genuineness, Stock uses a common philosophical conceptual tool -- that of fictionalism.  Outside of gender studies, Stock's main academic speciality is the philosophy of art, and a big question in that field is how we conceptually and cognitively deal with storytelling and fiction.  When we read stories, or watch TV, we often get very emotionally involved in the characters and events.  We have genuine emotions to non-real situations.  We get immersed in the storytelling.  Healthy immersion in a fiction is an appropriate midground between delusion on the one hand and non-belief on the other.

Stock thinks that this is what is going on with trans people.  There is an immersion in the fiction of changing sex/gender.  It is not actually real, but we (both the trans person and those around them) have real emotions and behaviours with respect to the fiction.  And Stock thinks that we should treat trans in this way -- we should get emotionally immersed in it, without either (a) being deluded into thinking it is a genuine gender change or (b) coldly disbelieving.

And so, for Stock, for the same reason that we can coherently talk about and emotionally care about non-existent fictional characters, we can and should also get appropriately immersed in the fiction of trans.

Consequently, it can be correct and appropriate to use a trans person's preferred name and pronoun (call a trans woman "she", etc).  We should emotionally connect with the trans woman, immersing ourselves in the fiction, using her preferred name and referring to her as "she/her".  It is not only polite and caring to the person as a person, but it is also linguistically accurate in the context of a fiction.  It is not a lie, for the same reason that talking about the attributes and actions of fictional characters is not a lie.

But Stock is quite clear that while she does this for most trans people, she refuses to do this for trans people who have committed sexual violence.  Stock directly and openly calls trans women who are sex offenders "he".  Their crime means that we should choose not to emotionally immerse ourselves with them in this fiction.  Through their crime they have lost that right.

I think Stock's position here is an interesting compromise, and departs from the usual extremes we often hear about in inflammatory public debates (between those who insist on calling trans women "he", and those who insist that a person's self-description is authoritative).  Nonetheless, trans people may say that an immersive fiction is still a fiction, and is failing to acknowledge their self-identity (more below).  And on the other side trans sceptics may similarly say an immersive fiction is still a fiction, and the truth is important when using pronouns (they prefer to coldly disbelieve the fiction).

But I'll put that aside and return to the earlier point of whether Stock's preferred definition of "man" and "woman" is correct/best.

Clearly Stock has a big job on her hands to knock down all the various definitions of gender (the many different ways that people have drawn boxes around reality).  For her position to work, she has to show how hers is the only position still left standing after the conceptual analysis battles.

And I am just not convinced that she has done it.

For 70+ years there has been a huge literature on this, including within philosophy and women/gender studies academic fields.  It really is a big ask to sweep a lot of that away.

I'm still struggling with the literature on this, though Stock's brief literature review in her book was useful.  While acknowledging my beginner status on this topic, I see two distinct main alternative approaches to understanding gender from the one that Stock prefers.

One important and useful way that many people drew the gender boxes around complicated reality was with regards to how in many societies (including ours) women did (and do) not have the same advantages and opportunities as men.  (As a simple example, recall my birth certificate where my dad's occupation was included but not my mum's.)

On top of the biological differences between men and women, there are also clear social differences between them.  These social differences are not clearly articulated when we talk about adult males and adult females.  So, using an alternative definition we can say that sex (male, female) is biological, but gender (man, woman) is social.

Pointing out these social differences, and the frequent power imbalances, is important and useful.  Clearly labeling these sorts of injustices is a first step towards correcting them.

It's been fairly standard for at least a few generations for many people to use the language of "man" and "woman" in this way.  My sense of it is that Stock is a little biased and not telling the full story when she says her preferred definition is the "traditional" one, as there are many of us who have grown up acclimatised to using "men" and "women" in this more social way.  This definition has been around long enough that it should not be dismissed as not fitting with how people use the words.  Usually in the context us English users can get the right idea about which definition people are using -- are we talking about children and adults, or are we talking about adults' social differences?  (In the same way that us English users usually know what the speaker is meaning when they say they went to the bank -- riverside or money-building.)

But this social definition of the words is more like a family of different definitions, as once we say that gender (man, woman) has to do with social differences then it opens up the question of which aspects, and in which society.  There will be a lot of different characteristics that we might include, to do with such things as roles, norms, expectations, behaviours, preferences, styles, occupations, activities, etc.

So, we might say that while a trans person doesn't literally change gender if we use Stock's "traditional" definition of gender, they may literally change gender if we use this social definition of gender.  They have taken on as their own certain roles, norms, behaviours, etc, of the other gender.  And this would seem to be a spectrum, or at least non-binary.

But there is a further complication: Initially, when thinking about power relations and unfairnesses, people generally saw these gendered characteristics as something to overcome and/or change.  For some people the task was to eliminate gender as understood in this way, so people can have more equality.  But later, other people saw these gendered characteristics as positive and actually to be adopted.

This is where it's possible to slide into the second main alternative to Stock's preferred definition of gender.

Sometimes people identify with those gendered characteristics.  They treat those characteristics as part of what it means to be that gender -- seeing people of that gender having them, or associating having those characteristics with being that gender.  And these people like these characteristics, or they see that they personally have them.  People self-identify with that gender.

This is where gender identity theory come in.  The basic thought is that people are the gender that they see themselves as.  This is clearly a third and distinct definition of gender, and it is one that more and more people are using these days.  For many people today, when we talk about gender they are simply assuming we are talking about gender identity, and nothing else.  Language changes over time, and in the past ten or more years language has definitely changed on this point.

As I see it, the basic difference between both of these alternative definitions of gender (from Stock's) is that the first is sociological (to do with the nature of society) while the second is psychological (to do with how people see themselves).  Both open up the possibility of gender being non-binary (more than just man or woman), as both involve multiple factors that may not all align.  Both also open up the possibility of genuine gender change (trans).

As I say, Stock devotes a lot of her book to discussing these theories/definitions of gender, and ultimately dismisses them all as flawed.  There is a lot to it, and sometimes I agree with Stock that certain versions of each of these broad accounts are weak.  But I couldn't help getting the sense that sometimes she was strawpersoning the stronger versions.  As I said above, sometimes I thought her tone of voice sounded biased, and other times I thought that surely there are more plausible versions than what she is critiquing.  But pinning this down more precisely would require me to delve into the literature much more than what I currently have.  Each would require it's own essay.

After reading Stock's book, I still couldn't see how these other two definitions of gender were overall wrong.  But maybe I have missed something.  As far as I can see, we have these three main definitions of gender --three different boxes drawn around reality.  And reality is as it is regardless of our boxes.  These boxes overlap in many ways, but not in all ways.  Each makes sense and has its use in its context, though I agree with Stock that sometimes it gets confusing which one people are meaning when they are talking to each other.  Sometimes people are simply talking past each other when they disagree about gender.

In what follows for the rest of this piece, I'll assume that transitioning is genuine and not fictional, on the basis that I think it makes more sense, in this context, to use either the social or the identity definitions of gender rather than the "traditional" definition.  That is, when people talk about transitioning, they're not so likely to be meaning to suggest that someone has literally changed from being an adult-human-male to being an adult-human-female (or vice versa).  I think they are meaning to refer to certain gendered social characteristics and/or identity.  And in that sense I don't see why we shouldn't think it's a real transition.

Practical stuff:

One reason why people get so concerned about language is that it's often used to give people social privileges or rights.  It influences what people do practically in the real world.  Who gets to play in the women's sports competitions?  Who gets to use the women's public toilets or changing rooms?  Who is allowed to use women's refuges?  Who is sent to women's prisons?  Who gets the public funding for women?  Who wins the women's awards?  Who is statistically counted as a woman when aiming at equal representation?

This matters, because in many of these cases siding one way advantages some people while simultaneously disadvantaging other people.  There are often real, practical, substantial gains and loses for people.

So, when we discuss these practical issues it is important to pick the appropriate definition that matches the relevant distinctions that context demands.  As I see it, different situations often require different criteria, and so a definition that is appropriate in one context may not be appropriate in another.  People who insist on using one definition in all situations are missing the point that reality is complicated.

Recalling from memory Stock's book (I'm writing this now a week later, and it's getting hazier as time goes on!), I felt that while she addressed many of these issues, often they were just in sections within chapters, when I thought they could have each used clearly separated chapters.  That is, I thought the book was a little light on some of these real world practical issues.

Nonetheless, my memory of Stock's position is that her main concern was with the recent tendency (past 10-20 years) for laws and society to apply the gender identity theory to all these different situations.  With each of these situations she didn't think that self-identification of one's own gender was the appropriate criterion we should use.  Either it was irrelevant to the reasons why we as a society had decided it was important to create specific separate women's categories, or it made things less safe for women.  Much of Stock's book was spent detailing the UK legal system, and the trans advocacy groups in that country (such as Stonewall) that have been pushing for the law to exclusively use gender identity as the definition of gender.  In this sense I often (though not always) agreed with Stock that self-identity is the wrong approach.  But sometimes I also wasn't sure if Stock's "traditional" definition was the right one either.  I'll go thorough a subset of examples.

Sports:

I enjoy playing sports, and I occasionally enjoy watching them too.  I think we all agree that participation in sports is important, and everyone should have the right to do so.  But sports by their nature are inherently unfair.

Take basketball, as an example.  Basketball heavily favours those who are taller over those who are shorter.  It is unfair in the sense that shorter people are unlikely to make it professionally.  Google tells me that the shortest current NBA player is Facundo Campazzo, who is 178cm (my height).  The average height of men is 175cm.  And the shortest current WNBA player is Raina Perez, who at 162cm is the average height for women.  This means that around half the population is effectively excluded from being involved in professional basketball simply because they happened to be born as they were (ie, shorter than average).  But society has decided that this is an allowable form of unfairness.  Basketball does not have separate competitions for people of different heights.

Shot put is another example.  I weigh 72kg, which means that the shot put I throw is 10% of my body weight.  On the other hand Ryan Crouser, the shot put world champ, weighs 145kg.  He only needs to throw 5% of his body weight.  Society has similarly decided that this is an allowable form of unfairness, and when competing in shot put no one thinks we should each throw different weights proportionate to our body weight.

In contrast, in sports like boxing and weightlifting we've decided that the body weight difference between competitors is not an allowable form of unfairness.  Instead, competitors are separated into different categories of body weight, and don't compete against each other.

What's important is that in these situations no one is being excluded from playing, but both approaches have different ways to set up the competing conditions.  Both are different ways of dealing with unavoidable unfairness in sports, and both result in different types of participation.

In almost all sports society has decided that men and women competing against each other is a form of unallowable unfairness, similar to weightlifting.  But until recently society has generally left it fuzzy about which definition of sex/gender we should use when creating these sports competition categories.  It hasn't mattered.  The recent (and right) social recognition of trans people has changed that, and we are now playing catchup to decide which is the appropriate definition in this context.

Trans advocates often say that gender identity theory -- what people self-identify as -- is the right definition.  You should compete in whichever category (men or women) in which you self-identify.

Stock argues against this, and thinks it is a form of unfairness that should not be allowed.

Amongst other things, Stock points out that one form of unfairness is due to males who have gone through puberty having significantly, on average, larger and more dense muscles that produce, on average, significantly better sporting performances.  This is not true of all males and females, but it is true for the most part.  This unfairness is in one direction only, as trans men don't have this physical advantage over males.

This means that if a male transitions to being a woman after puberty then she is almost certainly (though not always) going to have a muscle advantage over females, and hence a competitive advantage.  Transitioning doesn't remove this, no matter what medical treatment is used.  There is much to say about this sort of empirical evidence, which is an important field of research these days.  Biologist Jerry Coyne often writes about this on his blog.

Assuming the science is correct, the ethical question is whether this unfairness is socially allowable or not.  Or, to put it another way, are trans women in sport similar to tall people in basketball, or are they more similar to heavier people in weightlifting?

Stock, Coyne and others think it is more like weightlifting.  That is, they think that the advantage that trans women who transition after puberty have is a form of unfairness that should not be allowed.

Their preferred solution to this is to say that in sports where this muscle difference is a significant performance difference trans women who transitioned after puberty should not be allowed to compete in the women's category.  Instead, it is suggested that an open category competition be started, welcoming trans women and others.

So, this is yet another of the ways that Stock often gets on the wrong side of the rainbow community.

To repeat, this specific position is not saying that trans women are not women.  It is consistent with this position to say that trans women are women, but that those who have gone through male puberty should not compete in women's competitions.  It's also not saying that trans people should not be involved in sport.  It is a narrow point about what sorts of sports involvement are appropriate, and the specific criteria for deciding this is relevant only for this specific situation.  It also has nothing at all to say about trans women's involvement in other public areas (such as women's spaces), which may use other criteria.  It is not in any way transphobic or anti-trans.

When considering the ethics, I think lost opportunities for females in sport is important.  Given the historic (and current) disadvantages often in women's sports (unequal competitions, prizemoney, advertising, media coverage, sponsorship, branding, professional opportunities, etc), it's probably important not to add additional unfainesses for females.  In this sense I think this is different from the lost opportunities I personally have from being half Crouser's body weight.

Nonetheless, I also think a relevant factor is the proportion and percentage of trans women in this situation, and whether they are disproportionately winning places, entries, money and sponsorships that consequently take away from too many females.  Stock says they are, while Forrest Valkai (link above) says they aren't.

I'm willing to be convinced either way on this, but based on the specific cases I have read about of trans women succeeding in women's competitions (such as those who pre-transition as men only had moderate competition success, but post-transition as women have had significant success), I am inclined to think this type of unfairness creates too many lost opportunities for females and so should not be allowed.  That is, I think Stock is correct, and I think an open category makes sense.

In addition to unfairness, Stock also raises the issue of safety in contact sports.  Stock thinks that when trans women who have transitioned after puberty compete in contact sports their likely physical advantages are significant enough to make it less physically safe for female players.  We'd have to look at the empirical evidence on this, but I think Stock does enough to show this is plausibly true and another reason to adopt her preferred solution above.

In other words, I think none of the gender definitions discussed in the sections above are relevant with respect to sport.  It is not about one's sex (however defined), it is not about social roles, etc, and it is not about self-identification.  It is, instead, about the ongoing muscle/performance advantages that male puberty gives.  So, I think often the definitions above are a distraction when thinking about real-world practical stuff.  Thinking about sport gives us a template for thinking about other social issues.  Look at the specific issues and ignore the definitions, to figure out which box we should draw around reality for that specific situation.

Women's public spaces:

There are various types of women's only public spaces, including changing rooms, toilets, abuse refuges/shelters and prisons.  What they have in common is that they have all been historically set up as places for women to exclusively be, often doing sensitive/private things away from men.

For many women these are essential social services, where they can feel more secure during vulnerable moments while out in public.

Historically, for the most part these places have worked in a self-policing kind of way.  If people are perceived as women they are allowed in, while if they are perceived as men they are not.  If someone who is perceived to be a man enters a women's only public space, then other users have historically felt entitled to question/challenge them on this.

However, with more (and right) social awareness of trans people, the question has arisen about which type of public space they should use --the women's or the men's.  This is especially important because many trans people don't "pass" as the gender they have transitioned to.

Trans advocates emphasising gender self-identity have said that people should be allowed to use whichever space suits their self-identity -- whatever you feel yourself to be, then you use that space.  Moreover, they say, other users should not question anyone else on this -- other users should let them in to use the space, regardless of what they look like.  Stock names and discusses trans advocacy groups that have worked to try to get this recognised in law.

Once again, this is where Stock gets on the wrong side of the rainbow community, as she argues against this gender self-identity approach to these sorts of public spaces.

For Stock, the relevant criteria with respect to women's spaces are safety and safeguarding.  And similar to sports, Stock thinks that this issue is in one direction only -- she doesn't think it's a problem for trans men to use men's only public spaces if they choose.  Stock is concerned that allowing trans women to use women's only spaces makes these spaces significantly less safe for females, and this outweighs the competing interest that trans women have to use those spaces.

Again, this specific concern is not questioning whether trans women are women.  However, unlike with sports, this penalises trans people more, as if Stock is right it would often require them to use the public spaces of their old gender.  Unlike with sport, where Stock's solution of gender-neutral open categories is feasible, in the near future it is not always possible to everywhere have gender-neutral spaces. Many trans women are not willing to accept this, so this becomes a real political battle of public resource use.

Stock discusses ways in which she thinks allowing trans women to use women's spaces makes it less safe for females, including:

1.  It opens up the possibility for opportunistic male sex predators to claim to be women in order to enter women's spaces for their own sexual gratification.  This may range from more passive voyeurism to more active physical contact and abuse.

2.  As we saw in the case of sports, those who have gone through male puberty are very likely to be physically stronger than those who haven't.  This means that if these male sexual predators are permitted into women's spaces, then they are likely to be able to physically overwhelm any lone females using these spaces.  Whether or not this happens in reality, for some females this perception may mean that they prefer not to use these spaces if trans women are included, meaning that they miss out on the benefits of these public resources.

3.  Specifically in the case of women's refuges, where the users are often there because of abuse by men, it can be psychologically traumatic for victims to encounter male-looking bodies in the refuge.  This applies to both users of women's refuges and also staff working there who are male-looking.

4.  Stock says that statistically men are much more likely to be sex offenders than women, and she thinks that this is something that is genetically inbuilt in the male body, regardless of whether they have later transitioned or not.  Allowing male-bodied people into women's spaces significantly increases the chances of sexual predation.

Alongside this, Stock emphasises that almost all men are not sexual predators, and almost all trans women are similarly not sexual predators.  But she thinks that it is about safeguarding.  She says that laws are sometimes put in place to protect people from the small minority, even though it's accepted that the vast majority are non-problematic.  She thinks that women's spaces should similarly be set up on the basis of safeguarding.

Stock is at her strongest when she is arguing against the extremity of gender self-identity, and these are all plausible reasons in favour of restricting at least some types of women's spaces away from a purely self-identity approach.  I think Stock has done enough to show that with respect to some types of women's public spaces these other criteria discussed ought also apply besides self-identity.  But it's all in the details, and Stock does discuss some aspects.

In the case of prisons we might, for example, specify in law that self-identified trans women are also required to pass other criteria, such as not being convicted sex offenders and showing evidence of long-term transition, before they are placed in women's prisons.

The purpose of women's refuges is to help people in need, so they should not turn away trans women in need.  But they do need to be sensitive to nuance and individual traumas.  So, they should be able to  somewhat screen trans women on arrival, if needed, sensitively placing people according to their individual needs and separating them if needed.  They may also choose not to hire men and trans women as frontline staff, if it is determined that this is too psychologically traumatic for some victims who use this public service.

In these respects I mostly agree with Stock.

It's less clear regarding open-access public changing rooms and toilets, where there is no gatekeeping on entry.  Recognising the existence and needs of trans people, as a society we need to put more funding and resources into changing and upgrading these public spaces into unisex facilities, thereby avoiding the winner/loser problem of trans rights versus women's rights.

(Exactly what's needed -- unisex cubicle toilets at Christchurch airport.)

But this is a long-term project, and it doesn't help right now if a trans woman needs to use the toilet while out in public -- does she enter the door with the picture of the woman or the man?

As I wrote above, Stock is sometimes somewhat biased in her language, and in this respect I did not see much effort by her to sensitively present the trans view on this.  On this point, and elsewhere, I read her book as more of an advocator for female rights, rather than a neutral assessor of the evidence.

So, in reply to Stock we might:

1.  Counterbalance the concern about female safety with a similar concern about trans women safety.  In contrast, there may be a greater danger for trans women using men's spaces, as groups of (drunk, aggressive) men using men's spaces may wrongly see a lone trans woman in there as sexual and available.  It is conceivable that a trans woman is actually more at risk alone in a men's bathroom than females are from males using women's spaces.  In the end, sadly, this is an empirical question of which option is likely to result in real-world least harms to people, while recognising that neither is ideal.

2.  Question if safeguarding is the right approach.  While in some situations safeguarding is appropriate (I discuss this with respect to homeschooling here), other times it's not.  For example, when it comes to road safety we often don't apply the principle of safeguarding.  If we did, we might not let so many people drive, preferring to restrict certain categories of people who are statistically less safe drivers (eg under-25s, etc).  But as a society we think that allowing the freedom of driving for everyone is worth it, despite the occasional harms to innocent bystanders that it causes.  We may similarly think this with women's spaces -- allowing the freedom of use by trans women is worth it, despite the occasional harms.

3.  Simply emphasise that this is a human rights issue.  If Stock's position is correct, it means that innocent people are punished merely by association.  Do we want to live in the sort of society in which some blameless people are losing out simply because they happen to share some characteristics with others who have done wrong things?

As a man (I don't think I self-identify, and I'm not especially attached; I just think I'm mostly socially acclimatised), I don't have a dog in this fight.  I use the men's public spaces, and I'm not asking to use the women's.  So, it's not about me and I should have no say in the matter.

But for what it's worth, here's my thoughts:

When I use changing rooms, etc, I don't care who else is using them alongside me.  I also don't care if the occasional person is (weirdly!) having sexual thoughts about me while I'm getting changed, etc.  As long as I'm not physically impeded from doing what I'm there to do, it doesn't bother me at all.

My understanding is that some women feel similar to me, while others do not.  Some don't care, while others are greatly concerned about a trans woman changing alongside them, or peeing in the cubicle next to them.  Sometimes they care specifically about children, perhaps thinking that somehow seeing a different-bodied person getting changed will harm the child.  But sometimes I get the impression that for some people it's not so much about safety/safeguarding, but rather a strong feeling of distaste/disgust/fear that drives them to be against trans women using women's public spaces.  They just don't want male-looking bodies near them in that situation, even if it's completely safe and non-sexual.

As far as I can see, this is something that society needs to decide on collectively.  Which of these aspects above deserve greater weight when decision-making?  Whatever happens there'll be winners and losers, and not everyone will get what they want.  Whatever happens, likely some people will protest.  That is simply politics.

Reemphasising that it's not my decision to make, my inclination (for what it's worth) is to prioritise freedom and optimism.  As a society I think we should value freedom, and let's hope that people are not as bad as Stock suggests.  Let's hope that people can simply use changing rooms and toilets for what they are intended to be used for, disinterestedly doing their own thing alongside others without bothering about what they look like.  Maybe start out with a freer, less regulated gender self-identity approach to changing rooms and toilets, and hope that people will make it work safely (so far that seems to be the case, as trans women have been using women's bathrooms now for many years).  But if there is misuse, then consequently tighten things up accordingly.  If there are some geographic areas in which abusive males are taking advantage of the situation, at that point put in place restrictions at those places to stop male-looking people using those particular woman's spaces.

Women's funding and representation:

One further practical issue that Stock discusses is to do with who counts as a woman for statistical, funding and representational purposes.

This returns us to the earlier discussion above in the section on gender, looking at how historically (and sometimes still today) women have been discriminated against and haven't had the same opportunities that men have had.

To correct this, there are often social policies specifically put in place to aim to increase women's participation and remuneration.  This may include specific funding for women, promoting the inclusion of women in decision-making, and women's support organisations.  To make these work efficiently, data is collected on women's versus men's situations.

With the recent (and right) social recognition of trans women, an important question is whether trans women should be included in the women's category specifically with respect to these opportunities and statistics.

Trans advocates who emphasise gender self-identity say they should be.  They argue that since trans women are women they need to be included, and excluding them is unfair discrimination.

But once again this is where Stock gets on the wrong side of the rainbow community, arguing against using the gender self-identity approach to this issue.

The thought here is that we need to go back to look at the original purpose for why society targets women specifically for these special advantages.  That is, the appropriate criteria here involves recognising that the purpose is to right past wrongs and level the playing field.

So, a relevant question is whether trans women are part of the group who were wronged in this way.  Or if not, are they relevantly similarly wronged, such that the same sorts of social corrections should also apply to them.

Stock thinks they aren't, and so they shouldn't.  Her concern is that trans women are taking away opportunities from females -- for every trans woman who get some advantage from this socially targeted correction, a female misses out.

The thought here is that on the social definition of gender one aspect of being a woman is that one grows up from birth with certain social disadvantages.  A male who transitions to being a woman, and especially if she transitions after puberty, does not grow up experiencing those sorts of unfair discriminations.  And the thought is that it is these particular sorts of gendered characteristics that are relevant when considering women's funding and representation.

In reply, trans advocates may point out that trans women have their own unfairnesses pre-transition, or that post-transition experience similar unfairnesses as other women.

I'm on the fence on this one, and I can definitely see Stock's point, especially if there are women's groups which are being dominated by trans women, as she suggests.  For some females it may seem like another instance where males are taking over and dominating, precisely where it was supposed to be about them.  On the other hand, if trans women are not taking over and are deserving of the same sorts of special treatment, then I think trans women should be included as women in this context.

Medical treatment for children wishing to transition:

The final point I wish to discuss here is with respect to how society should understand and respond to children who say they identify as the other gender and wish to transition.

Trans advocates emphasising gender self-identity say that we should have a policy of affirm only, if children say they identify with the other gender.  That is, we should not doubt or question them at all on this, but support and affirm their self-perceptions and opinions.  If a child says they are trans, then we should accept that they are really trans, without question.

Stock question this, once again getting on the wrong side of the rainbow community.  This is also something that Coyne writes about frequently on his blog, and both Stock and Coyne seem to have similar views.  This includes:

1.  In many other areas of psychology, when health workers are working with troubled people they don't necessarily accept at face value the perception that their patients have of themselves.  It is recognised that their self-perceptions may be mistaken -- people don't always know their own selves best, and that is why there is an entire field of psychology to investigate this.  So, while it's important to be supportive, it is essential to remain diagnostically neutral regarding patients' self-perceptions.  It would be odd if gender dysphoria is the one psychological area in which patients are always correct in their self-perception.

2.  Children often have changeable opinions, as they grow and mature over time.  It's possible that for some children their perception of themselves as transgender may change over time as they mature.

3.  Feeling that one is the other gender sometimes exists alongside other psychological issues, and it's not clear about the relationship between them.  It seems that sometimes the feeling of being the other gender is caused by other issues, such as abuse or an unstable family life, and the real need is to correct those problems.

4.  Lately, there has been a rapid increase in the number of transgender teens.  To what extent is this an appropriate correction and recognition of something that has always been there (similar to what happened historically when lefthandedness changed from being socially not accepted to being socially accepted)?  And to what extend is this caused by fashion trends in teens (it's cool to be trans, and everyone wants to do it)?

5.  What is the relationship between transgender and homosexuality?  Recognising the above, is it sometimes possible that children may wrongly interpret their homosexuality as transgender?

6.  To what extent can children be psychologically mature enough to make permanent decisions about their bodies?  To what extent can there be informed consent?

7.  This all means that we should be wary of any treatment that is permanent.  It's possible that a child who medically transitions may at a later time change their view of themselves and regret the permanent medical change.

8.  Many of the medical treatments are new and relatively untested, and it's sometimes not clear what the long-term side-effects and consequences might be.

I see two main consequences of these concerns:

Firstly, this strongly questions the accept and affirm only approach to children's transgender claims, which trans advocates argue for.  I agree with Stock that professionals and parents, etc, should be open to the possibility that the child may be mistaken or the transgendered feelings may be temporary.  I agree that we should take the same approach with transgender as we do with other psychological issues, and not assume that the person's self-perception is necessarily correct.

Secondly, to what extent should medical treatment be offered for children who wish to transition, and to what extent should it be postponed?  Stock, Coyne and others seem to suggest that permanent medical treatment should not be given until after the person has reached adulthood.  At that point they can decide for themselves, giving informed consent.

Nonetheless, I'm concerned that this may go too far the other way.  The thing is, withholding medical treatment can itself be an active decision with permanent results.  Withholding treatment may also leave the child with a lifetime of consequences in a body that has gone through puberty to permanently be a certain way.  I'm inclined to think it should be more of a case by case basis, with as much checking as possible that the individual child is serious about it.  Hold off as long as possible, having as much psychological assessment as possible, but still be open to the possibility of permanent medical treatment if otherwise the child would permanently be their sincere non-preferred gender.

Conclusions:

If you've got this far, then congratulations!  At about 10,000 words I've been speeding through writing this for the past couple of weeks, while also keeping up with normal life.  It's been mostly done from memory, so I hope I've got people's views correct and not missed out anything obvious.  As time went on I started to get a little hazy on some of the details, and who said exactly what.  Please do let me know if I've messed up, and I'll edit and update as needed.  I hope it's clear that in these sorts of situations goodwill and good intentions are essential, and getting something wrong doesn't imply offence.

As I've suggested throughout, I think Stock's book is a very useful addition to the current discussion of gender and transgender, though it does need to be read with caution.

In my opinion Stock is a very good thinker and academic, and hers is a well thought through, respectable and well-argued position.  It definitely deserves to be heard (and I think it's a tragedy that the toxic, bullying environment forced her to resign from Sussex University).  I see this book as a useful correction and counter-balance to certain current popular thinking, which sometimes, in an attempt to (rightly) correct the injustices done against transgender people, goes too far and gets the logic and ethics wrong.  Stock does well to point these out.

However, I'm also equally concerned that books like this may be weaponised by people who think it's not okay to be transgender.  While I don't see any evidence of Stock herself being anti-transgender, I do think that in situations where not everyone can politically get their own way she clearly often sides with females and against transgender.  That is, Stock sometimes slides into women's advocacy and is not always a reliable neutral assessor of the situation.  Contrary to Stock, I still think it makes sense to say that transgender people really do transition to the other gender, and it's not a fiction.  Not only do I think this makes sense in the context of language and definitions, but I also think it's really important as a way of showing acceptance and inclusion.  I think many of the ethical points Stock makes can and should be made without rejecting real gender change.

What is a woman?

Several weeks ago I wrote about a YouTube interview with Kathleen Stock.  It inspired me to request Stock's book, Material Girls, from the library.

I got an email from the library this morning -- finally it's my turn.  I'll aim to pick up the book in the next few days.

Meanwhile, to get me in a certain frame of mind I watched Abigail Thorn's video:

As I suggested in my earlier post, I want to try to get clearer in my head why we might choose to use one definition of the word "woman" over another.  Why does Stock choose to use the "adult human female" definition over the others?  And how does choosing that linguistic/conceptual framework then logically (and socially) carve up our world?  Is this a better way of carving up our world than some other way?  And better for whom?

To put it in the context of Thorne's video, to what extent is Stock engaging in Earth 2 thinking, and to what extent is her definition of woman like the Earth 2 definition of schmite (is that how it's spelt?!)?

Kathleen Stock

I really enjoyed listening to this conversation.

One and a half hours of calm, relaxing, quiet, slow, careful and nuanced discussion of a topic that almost everywhere else is unpleasantly confrontational and argumentative.

For those still not sure what I'm talking about, it's the issue of trans rights versus women's rights.  And it's a discussion with Kathleen Stock.

In my opinion, this is exactly the way a civilised discussion should go, regardless of one's opinions on the various matters discussed.

I see this as essential viewing, and after watching it I've requested Stock's book, Material Girls, from the library.

There are a few things I'd like to read more details on:

1. Stock's analysis of the various ways that the words "woman" and "man" are defined and used.  I know that the words are ambiguous, and commonly used in several different ways (with people consequently often talking past each other).  So I'm curious why Stock, after analysing the terms, chooses to use the words one way rather than another.

That is, as I understand it, Stock consciously and knowingly chooses to use the words with minimal social/psychological content.  That is, for Stock a woman is an adult human female and a man is an adult human male.  These particular definitions of the words are both common and useful, as in society it is useful to distinguish between immature and mature people -- boy and man or girl and woman.

Nonetheless, some definitions of the words also include various social or psychological features, such as social norms/roles or self identification.  And in the context of social issues, is it also important to use language (clearly and appropriately, of course) that also includes those features?

I don't know.  So, I want to read more and think more about which definition of the words I should choose to use.

2. I was also interested in Stock's use of fictionalism.  Given the definition of woman/man above, this sort of explanation seems necessary for how to understand the common wider use of the words.  But one downside of this understanding is that it seems to require that some users of the words are perhaps not self-aware that they are engaging in fiction.  And is this a problem?

3. Then beyond language use there's also the practical social implications -- sport, prisons, changing rooms, women's refuges, etc, etc.  As in any social issue it's rare to satisfy all, so it's about balancing out competing rights, harms, preferences, opportunities, etc.  Case by case, what are some compromise practical solutions?

School music and PE

This year Mulan is doing Year 11 Music at school, and is sitting NCEA 1.

Along with music theory and history there is also a practical component, where the students prepare and perform pieces, which are assessed.  One assessment is a group performance, while another is solo.

The school does not tell students which instrument to use, or which pieces to play.  The students choose the instruments they are personally most skilled at, and over a number of weeks practice and polish their pieces both in and out of class (and often with their private teachers).

In other words, one aim of Music at school is to assess the students' specialist areas at their best.

What would school Music be like if, instead of this, the students' practical component was assessed by looking at how well they learnt a new instrument they'd never played before?  What if the school chose the instrument that all students were required to play (intentionally choosing a more obscure instrument that likely no one has played before), gave the students a few weeks of in-class lessons, then evaluated their performance playing that new instrument?

This year Mulan is also doing Year 11 PE at school, and is sitting NCEA 1.

Similar to Music, PE in school has both a theory and practical component.  (Although one difference is that the theory component of PE is entirely internally assessed, whereas Music has some external assessments.)

This year Mulan's school has decided to assess all Year 11 PE students on both gymnastics and handball.  Students do not choose the sport they are assessed in.

Last term Mulan's class went out of school to have gymnastics lessons at North Harbour Gymnastics.  During class they prepared routines, which they then performed for assessment.  Some students had never done gymnastics before, and so the lessons and routines were fairly beginner level.  Mulan was lucky** that for a few years and up until about a year ago she'd casually learnt gymnastics.  Consequently, Mulan found the required gymnastics skills both familiar and easy, and she comfortably achieved excellence on that assessment.  (**Or was Mulan unlucky that those school lessons were a bit of a waste of time for her?!)

This term the students will be introduced to handball, an Olympic sport that's popular in Europe but almost unheard of here in New Zealand.  Mulan's PE teacher told us that this sport was intentionally chosen as likely none of the students have done it before.  Teachers will observe and assess the students as they learn this unfamiliar sport, getting to know the rules of the game and acquiring the basic skills.  As part of the assessment students will also need to reflect on their learning experience.

What would school PE be like if, instead of this, the students were assessed in sports that they were most skilled at?  What if the students chose their own sport, worked on polishing their skills, and then were observed and assessed performing at their specialist best?

Why is it that at school Music is seen as a subject in which students are encouraged to perform as skillfully as possible in their chosen specialist area, whereas in PE one is assessed more on one's learning attitude, reflections and teamwork spirit?

Freedom of mind

This is a thought-provoking article about Susan Stebbing and her 1939 book Thinking to Some Purpose.

As I see it, what's especially interesting is how directly relevant many of her ideas are to our current situation.

For one thing, Stebbing distinguishes between political/economic freedom versus "freedom of mind".  She writes:

If it were in fact true that we were all politically and economically free, still it would not follow that we were possessed of the freedom of mind without which, in my opinion, no democratic institutions can be satisfactorily maintained.

That's an interesting thought, that democratic institutions cannot be satisfactorily maintained without people knowing how to think freely.

Thus, the aim of her book is to help people become more free in this more fundamental sense.

The aim is to help people to become better thinkers, by training them in thinking skills and giving them knowledge of how thinking failures happen (though 80+ years later it's a bit dated!).

The article gives an example:

What does thinking clearly involve? One important step, Stebbing argues, is to train ourselves out of bad habits of thinking. For example, she describes what she calls ‘potted thinking’. This is oversimplifying ideas using crude characterisations or slogans. While slogans aren’t always a bad thing, Stebbing thinks that they have a tendency to oversimplify more nuanced or sophisticated views and to hide the intricacies of an idea behind a catchy phrase.

When I read this I couldn't help thinking of the "freedom" protests against the Covid mandates.  Too often, the "freedom" slogans drowned out more nuanced views.  Too often, the protestors' crude characterisations of freedom meant they did not acknowledge the increased freedoms that Covid mandates gave.  Too often, the protestors lacked freedom of mind.

Today's lunchtime YouTube viewing

As usual, I watched YouTube while eating lunch today.

It was a good one.  I highly recommend Abigail Thorn's new Vaccines and Freedom video:

There's a little bit of overlap with what I said in my Covid and Freedom post back in November (that's to be expected with anyone who has studied the topic from a philosophical perspective).  Again, trust, freedom and harms are central issues.  But Abigail gives more detail, and much more style.

As she says in reply to one of the comments, she deliberately tries to make the learning non-competitive.  In my opinion, that's philosophy at its best, and what we should all be aiming for.

HASCA and Covid

HASCA is the local homeschooling organisation that organises and provides a centre for sport and cultural activities for homeschoolers on the North Shore (Auckland).

In some cases, it's the only place that local homeschoolers can access activities (as otherwise it's via the schools).

Today, as HASCA members, we received an email from HASCA leadership:

Re: Temporary Hibernation

14/12/21

Dear HASCA members and friends,

We have been silent throughout lockdown and the subsequent change from the Alert Level System to the Covid Protection Framework (CPF) as, 1) we have basically been unable to operate, and 2) we have wanted to watch and wait and make a considered decision on how HASCA will move forward under the new mandates.

As well as the government’s directives, our decisions have been influenced by the organisations we partner with - the sports organisations, programme providers, and the venues we hire and utilise to bring our classes and programmes to our home-schooling community. Unfortunately, many are either under government mandate themselves, or have their own in-house mandates which will impact on HASCA’s operations and our ability to provide any sort of non-discriminatory programme for the immediate future.

HASCA strives to be an inclusive organisation that brings people together, connects and supports, and “creates community” for all home educating families. Therefore, segregating or excluding participation based on vaccine status is not something we feel comfortable adopting, and is not where our hearts are placed. Our goal has always been to bring people together, not to divide. We do not want to operate any of what we previously offered if participation and inclusion is based on a vaccine status or the presence of a vaccine-pass. It is for this reason that the HASCA committee has decided that HASCA and all activities operating under our umbrella will hibernate for the foreseeable future. This has been a difficult decision for us, but we simply cannot run programmes knowing we must exclude select families.

[...]

We think they've got this badly wrong.  They make it sound like vaccinations are mostly meaningless, having no significant impact on the health and safety of others who we might interact with.  We have replied to them as follows:

Hi HASCA leadership,

 

As long-term HASCA members we respectfully disagree with this HASCA decision.  We hope that you will reconsider.

 

It's sad that it's the kids who will be the losers in this HASCA decision.  Something is better than nothing for homeschooled children; for HASCA to remove this option for local families is wrong as in many cases this is the only place where local homeschooling children can participate.

 

There is no unfair discrimination in the vaccine pass mandates; it's about following the science, protecting the vulnerable, giving people free choices, then people accepting the consequences of their free choices.  Requiring vaccine passes when people gather in larger groups protects everyone by slowing down the transmission of a contagious disease that would otherwise overwhelm the hospitals.  In saying this, we accept the overwhelming majority opinion of the experts.  As homeschoolers, we aim to model good reasoning to our children.

 

We feel that as a vaccinated family we have done the right thing for the community, and it is not right that vaccinated families are now being penalised by HASCA, just because of the free choices of non-vaccinated families.

 

We assume this means that HASCA won't be organising the Athletics Day and Swimming Day in 2022.  But please do let us know if anything changes.

 

Glenn, Xiaoying, Mulan and Miya

Likely, next year our family would have done the HASCA Athletics and Swimming Days in term 1 (which we help organise), and Miya would have signed up for the HASCA netball team (terms 2 and 3).

UPDATE (17/12/2021): HASCA also posted a similar announcement to their Facebook page, to which I commented that we (our family) respectfully disagreed with their decision and linked to this blog for details.

To date there have been four responses.  Three other members commented on the Facebook announcement, thanking the HASCA committee for their work.  And HASCA leadership emailed me privately, letting me know that the HASCA committee unanimously agreed with the decision.  At no time so far has anyone responded to the substantive points.

I want to emphasise that everyone has been extremely polite and nice about it.  Everyone thanks each other and wishes each other all the best.  Once again, I have no doubt that everyone sees themselves as the good guys -- they believe they are doing the decent and right thing.  And for the most part they are.  Homeschoolers really are nice people, and we enjoy spending time with them.

But I also want to acknowledge that old saying -- the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

In this situation, HASCA leadership has made the decision to block access to education for local homeschooled children.  They can coat it with nice words, but the fact remains that they have made things worse for local homeschooled children.

The only reason they have given for this so far is that they think that the vaccine pass requirement for large group gatherings is unfairly discriminatory, and they don't want to exclude anyone.  So they'd rather exclude everyone.

It is fair enough if, individually, their families (committee members and the three Facebook commentators) choose to not participate until all families can participate -- that is their free right to freely choose for themselves.  (I understand that some families see HASCA as more about social gatherings.)

But it is wrong for HASCA leadership to deny other families the opportunity to make this free choice for themselves.  And it is wrong for HASCA leadership to reduce educational opportunities for children without providing alternatives.  As I see it, HASCA leadership has overstepped their duties by dictating (mistaken) morals to their members, while at the same time failing to uphold their more fundamental duty of providing educational opportunities to children that are otherwise only available to schooled children.

In my opinion, the correct thing for HASCA committee to do is to keep HASCA operating (for now), but acknowledge and accept the right for any HASCA families to not participate until they feel comfortable doing so.  This may mean a reduced leadership group, and committee members would be more than free to step aside for now.  It may also mean that HASCA would need to ask members to join the committee to continue to keep things running (I would consider it, if necessary); if they were unable to get the committee numbers then hibernating would be the right choice.

Given the (limited) feedback to date, there is a distinct possibility that a significant number of HASCA members are either (a) unable to participate because they have chosen to not vaccinate, or (b) unwilling to participate as they (mistakenly) see vaccine pass mandates as unfairly discriminatory.  If this is the case, then there is a distinct possibility that activity sign-up numbers would be too low to proceed anyway.  And so there is a distinct possibility that most (or all) HASCA activities would have to practically stop anyway due to insufficient numbers.   If this is the case, then so be it.

But HASCA leadership should have kept things going long enough to find this out first, one way or the other.  They should have opened it up to the members first, for the members to freely decide.  They should not have denied freedoms to their members.  And they should have thought more about the children who are missing out because of their decision to stop offering activities.

Covid and freedom

I've been unsure about whether to write this post.

I write this blog for two main reasons.  (a) To record our family's homeschool/life journey; we enjoy looking back at what we've done over the years.  And (b) when I come across interesting ideas, writing them down helps me with trying to understand them better.

I'm not sure this topic fits either reason.  To be blunt, I find the topic not especially challenging or interesting.  On the other hand, it is kinda topical.  So here goes.

I'll start by saying I'm a liberal.  By this, I just mean that liberal has to do with liberty which has to do with freedom.  In other words, a liberal thinks that freedom is very important.  (Yeah, I know that USers use words in weird ways, and for them "liberal" is either a term of abuse or praise, depending on their political affiliation.  But I'm going to ignore that stuff.)

So, for me, I take the view that the default is that people should be allowed to do whatever they want, whenever they want.  They should have their freedoms.

However, in the real world people bump up against each other in all sorts of ways.  We're a society, a community, after all.  It's practically impossible for everyone to have complete freedoms, because sometimes what I want and what you want conflict.  Only hermits don't have that problem.

So, in the real world we have to qualify things.  We can't have complete freedoms.  Maybe our slightly more nuanced liberal statement is that people should be allowed to do whatever they want unless it harms others.  When it harms others, then we need to figure out who has the right of way, and which freedoms it's better to restrict.

Speaking of right of ways, road rules are a good example.  We could have complete freedom on the road, with no road rules.  Everyone driving their own way, with no speed limits and no red light stopping requirements.  But we recognise that, while it would be fun to be free to drive at 200km/h, the downsides outweigh the upsides.  Besides the likelihood of dying or being injured, it would also take us longer to get where we want to go.  There'd be plenty of traffic jams slowing us down.

So, we agree to restrict our roading freedoms, because overall it's better for each of us.  Road rules reduce harms to us.

The road rules example introduces us to a curious fact about freedoms -- they come in different types.  Sometimes reducing one sort of freedom simultaneously increases another sort of freedom.  When we reduce our freedom to drive however we want by introducing road rules, we also increase our freedom to get where we want to go faster and with less chance of being killed.

We can call these two types of freedoms negative freedom and positive freedom.

Negative freedom is the absence of control by others (it's called negative because it's the absence of something -- barrier, constraint, interference).  Road rules reduce our negative freedom because they control our driving behaviours.  Positive freedom is the ability to do something (it's called positive because it requires something extra).  Road rules increase our positive freedom because they manage traffic flow to enable us to go where we want to go faster and safer.

Which type of freedom is more valuable?  Is it more important to not be told what to do, or is is more important to be able to do stuff?

It seems to me that in the road rules case, being able to go where we want faster and safer is far more important than being able to drive however I want on the road.  In this case the positive freedoms are more important than the negative freedoms, and if we can't have both then let's have road rules that allow us to get where we want to go.

So, we can argue that road rules actually increase our overall freedom, not reduce it, because some freedoms are more valuable than others.

So, there are two things to remember.  (1) There is no such thing as complete freedom, and in any society we have to have some restrictions on our freedom.  And (2) reducing some freedoms sometimes increases other freedoms, which can be more important.

Which brings us to Covid.

At the moment a small percentage of people are protesting their loss of freedoms.  Are they right?

Quite clearly, Covid lockdowns, mask requirements, vaccine passport mandates, etc reduce our negative freedoms.  They control our behaviours.

So, quite clearly we have lost some valuable freedoms.

If we're a liberal, as I am, then we need to have a good reason for justifying this.  The default is freedom, after all.

As with the road rules example, there are two aspects to think about, which are both linked together.  (a) Is the action from this freedom causing significant harm to others, and so would restricting this freedom reduce these harms?  And (b) are there more valuable positive freedoms associated with the negative freedoms, such that reducing the negative freedoms increases the positive freedoms?

In the same way that road rules manage traffic flow and so make things overall better for us, do Covid rules manage contagious disease flow and so make things overall better for us?  (Of course, we want faster traffic flow and slower disease flow.)

And this is where I say I don't know!

To answer this question we need to know certain empirical facts about the world, and we need to have certain skills and tools to analyse the facts properly.

While I hung out at university for 15 years, I never got around to studying epidemiology.  And while I got an A in my first year undergraduate stats course, and did a decent amount of social science, I'm not a statistical population modeler.  

I don't have the expertise to make an informed decision on this.  My years of study on other subjects don't give me the automatic right to opine on this issue.  If I did I would be arrogant.

(My rough opinion is that I could only respectably start to have a decently informed opinion on it after maybe about five-ish years of fulltime study on the specific subject matter, in a community of others, and under the tutorage of subject-experienced people.  Any less than that, and I wouldn't entirely trust myself.)

But if I don't know, then (assuming I should have an opinion on this; on some matters I really don't need to have an opinion) I've got to trust someone else on this.  To act in the world (protest or not?), I need to trust someone.

Unfortunately, no one is perfect.  So who should I trust?

This is where things get messy and complicated.

To tidy things a little, we could try to make a list of the sorts of qualities we might look for, such as:

• More than one person -- the more the better
• These people should be in communication with each other, explicitly interacting on specific points at issue -- they should be a community
• Each of these people should be working on the specific subject area fulltime, and should have been working on it fulltime for many years (ideally decades)
• These people should be publicly publishing their work, with oversight and constant checks, with replies, to minimise the chance that their publications have errors
• Their writings are being accepted in multiple reliable publications
• They should ideally be from as many places as possible, internationally located, with different ethnicities and genders 
• These people should have minimal conflicts of interest -- perhaps a personal history of working quietly in their field, without apparent political ambitions, before Covid happened and gave world-attention to their field of study

Then we could look at what they're saying, such as:

• Their communications are explicitly interacting with as many participants as possible, responding to points and challenges in fair ways
• They should be clearly changing their views if it is warranted, according to the latest, best evidence
• Given that we are not experts, we are not in a position to deeply judge the content subject-matter of what they say, however (and depending on our own critical thinking skills), we can, to some extent, evaluate the structures of reasoning in what they say

There is something of an iterative process to our evaluation.  The more we read (and read widely), the more experience we gain at evaluating what they are saying.  But it's important not to overstep our abilities.  It's important not to start thinking that we are equally competent to evaluate the subject matter.  To do so would be arrogant.  At best we should be evaluating the people who are evaluating the subject matter.

Someone who does something all day every day for decades is going to know significantly more than someone who has read several dozen articles on it during lockdown.  We can be pretty sure that if I (as a casual lockdown reader) have encountered a possible objection to what they're saying, more than likely they are very aware of it, and know the back and forth on it very well.  We can probably trust their conclusion; we shouldn't assume their conclusion is ignorant of our objection.

I hope it's clear that I don't think it should be an equal democracy.  Voting (on matters like this; not on everything) should be weighted according to how much individuals satisfy the sorts of criteria above.  On Covid matters, my vote should be close to zero.

Finally, once we have got a sense of who we think the expert community might be, we look to see if there is consensus among them.  There should be clear near-100% agreement on the solid, central issues, and some disagreements (with reasons and back-and-forth discussions) on the more cutting-edge issues.

When deciding on particular issues, we look for clear majority views.  While the minority may be right, all things being equal it is more likely that the majority is right.  While we should keep the minority opinions live and not ignored, we should go with the majority opinion if action needs to be taken.

How do we apply this to the Covid situation?

This is where I'm a bit conservative.  After spending 15 years at university (and being married to a university academic who spent 25 years there), I got to know quite a few academics in quite a few different disciplines.  On the whole, I think they satisfy the criteria of being trustworthy experts in their subject fields.  Yes, they have their quirks, and yes they aren't perfect, but on balance I think they're most suited to giving expert advice in their specific fields (though not outside their fields).

I've read some of the contrary views.  To me, they don't live up to the standards I think we should set for evaluating who we should trust.  They are not trustworthy.

I say trust the university academics and other fulltime professionals -- the epidemiologists, the statistical modelers, and so on.  Go with their community majority opinion.  Anything else would be arrogance on my part.

The details of the balance to be had between vaccinations, masks, social distancing, lockdowns, contact tracing, etc, is something that they are best placed to decide on.  Just let them do it, and I will go along with what they advise.  I trust that they are just as keen to get out of lockdown and return to normal life as the rest of us.  I don't buy that they are incompetent or in it for the power, etc.

Sometimes what they say may sound counterintuitive or not immediately obvious to us non-experts.  But that's the nature of complex issues.  Just because us casual readers don't "get it" immediately (or at all) doesn't mean to say that it's wrong.

As best I understand it (as a lockdown reader), the current best evidence from the experts is that unvaccinated and unmasked people really do harm others when they interact in public.  But because these harms are probabilistic and less direct, it may be not so immediately obvious to us non-experts.

The best I can understand is that these experts are saying that if we don't (and didn't) restrict freedoms in certain ways, then there will be greater harms to us all.  Restricting negative freedoms increases positive freedoms -- it allows us to socially participate safely, with fewer deaths, and without our hospitals being overwhelmed.  The restrictions that are advised are specific and targeted, and are there because they are beneficial at this time.  I also don't buy the "slippery slope" objections, that these restrictions are the first steps to more oppressive political control. 

As I see it, the negative freedoms that protestors are fighting about are not as important as the positive freedoms that we gain from the Covid restrictions.  In my opinion, Covid restrictions actually increase (valuable) freedoms.  The protestors have got their reasoning wrong (though I sympathise with their itchiness to go out and do stuff, and can understand their dislike of being told what to do).

And so, as I see it, it shouldn't merely be a personal choice for each person.  Respecting other people's choices may sound like the decent thing to do.  And it is when it comes to many/most choices in life.  But when choices harm others, we should not be respecting those choices or tolerating them.  We should respect the people and be kind to them (of course), but at the same time work to stop the harms that they are unintentionally doing to others.

(And yes, this was fairly uninteresting for me to write.  A lot of words to get to an obvious conclusion.  But, as always, happy to discuss further specific details to do with freedom and trust, and happy to be corrected if I'm wrong.)